Top 74%
in this catalogue (1041 scored practices)
Scores cluster high, so position within the catalogue is often more telling than the number alone.
Evidence of impact / measured public value1/3
Deployment and registration numbers (2.15M new voters, 21.4M enrolled) are confirmed, but no post-election accuracy, false-match or false-non-match data has been published.
Transparency, fairness & accountability1/3
IHEC has publicised rollout milestones to the press, but no technical audit, accuracy metrics or vendor contract terms are publicly available, and the decision to drop indelible ink was not accompanied by a published risk assessment.
Transferability / demonstrated replication2/3
Miru is an established biometric vendor with deployments elsewhere and the fingerprint-failure fallback model is conceptually portable, though no replication evidence yet exists.
Scalability beyond pilot2/3
The system was deployed nationwide for a ~30-million-voter general election, demonstrating operational scale, though only exercised once at that scale.
Governance, capability & sustainability1/3
Procurement ran through a single Council of Ministers-approved vendor contract with no identified independent oversight body or legal framework specific to biometric voting FRT.
Evidoria. Facial-Recognition Fallback — Iraq's IHEC Adds Face Biometrics to Voter Verification for the 2025 Election. Persistent ID: 40b55421-1d76-4bca-8465-a9e4d1eede67.