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Good practice Imported

Bangabandhu Hi-Tech City (Kaliakoir) — A Cautionary Tale in Tech-Park Planning

Bangladesh · Kaliakoir · See the Bangladesh profile

Evidence: Descriptive / self-reported Top 98% 33/100 · Ask Evidence Copilot about this practice

Built with a US$120m World Bank loan and marketed as a 100,000-job 'cyber capital,' Bangladesh's Bangabandhu Hi-Tech City had reached only about 13,000 workers across five tenants by late 2020, with much of the 355-acre site reported vacant.

US$120 million
World Bank loan (2011)
US$555 million
World Bank facility (2021)
355 acres
Site area
100,000
Original jobs target (by 2025)
5
Companies manufacturing on site (as of November 2020)
~13,000
Workers employed on site (as of November 2020)
~5,000
Daily arrivals for low-skill work (as of ~2020)

Details

Maturity
Discontinued
Promoter
Bangladesh Hi-Tech Park Authority (BHTPA)
Period
2011-2025
Keywords
technology park, industrial policy, manufacturing, software, special economic zone

Context

Originally proposed in 1999 and developed under Bangladesh's Hi-Tech Park Authority (BHTPA) with a US$120 million World Bank loan signed in 2011 (followed by a further US$555 million World Bank facility in 2021 for tech-park and economic-zone investment), Kaliakoir Hi-Tech Park — renamed Bangabandhu Hi-Tech City in 2016 — was marketed as Bangladesh's future 'cyber capital,' expected to employ 100,000 workers on its 355-acre site in Gazipur district by 2025.

Objectives

The park aimed to build a high-value software and technology employment cluster on public land backed by multilateral development-bank financing and a well-known government brand.

Activities

Development involved BHTPA, private developers (Summit Technopolis, Bangladesh TechnoSity) and World Bank financing to build out infrastructure and attract anchor tenants; Hyundai Motor Company's manufacturing plant became the most prominent anchor tenant actually located there.

Results

Actual uptake has fallen far short of the target. As of November 2020, only five companies were manufacturing on site, employing about 13,000 workers combined, with independent reporting describing roughly 5,000 people arriving daily for largely low-skill assembly and data-entry work rather than the higher-value software jobs originally envisioned; that same reporting has described large sections of the park's buildings as vacant and deteriorating.

Conclusions

This practice is included as a cautionary case: it demonstrates that public land, sizeable infrastructure investment (including multilateral development-bank financing) and a well-known government brand are not sufficient on their own to build a functioning tech cluster without complementary transport links, streamlined bureaucracy and a credible pipeline of anchor investors — all cited as contributing factors to the shortfall.

Implementation
Indicative cost
Very high (> €5M)
Time to results
Long (> 3 years)
Staffing & skills
Bangladesh Hi-Tech Park Authority (BHTPA) administrators, private park developers (Summit Technopolis, Bangladesh TechnoSity), World Bank project supervision staff

Conditions for success

  • complementary transport links connecting the site to labour markets and logistics
  • streamlined bureaucracy for anchor investors
  • a credible, secured pipeline of anchor tenants before or during construction, not after

Common failure modes

  • a decade after the $120m World Bank-financed launch, only five companies were manufacturing on site with about 13,000 workers, roughly 13% of the 100,000-job target
  • large sections of the park's buildings are reported vacant and deteriorating
  • actual jobs are largely low-skill assembly and data-entry work (~5,000 people arriving daily) rather than the higher-value software jobs originally envisioned
  • public land, sizeable infrastructure investment and a strong government brand proved insufficient without complementary transport links, streamlined bureaucracy and a credible anchor-investor pipeline

Commonly funded by

National / regional programmes

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Data sources

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