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Good practice Imported

Libya's Women's Parliamentary Quota Rollback — From 30% to 16% (Law No. 2 of 2021)

Libya · Tripoli · See the Libya profile

Evidence: Observational / pre–post Top 91% 15/100 · Ask Evidence Copilot about this practice

Libya's Law No. 2 of 2021 cut the House of Representatives' women's candidate quota from 30% to 16% (32 of 200 seats), reversing earlier gains and leaving women at just 14% of parliament — a cautionary case on how unlegislated quota levels can be rolled back.

30% → 16% % of seats
Parliamentary women's candidate quota (House of Representatives) (2015–2021)
32 of 200 seats
Reserved seats for women under Law No. 2 of 2021 (2021)
14 %
Women's actual parliamentary representation (2021)
30 %
GNU appointive gender quota commitment (2021)
Libya's Women's Parliamentary Quota Rollback — From 30% to 16% (Law No. 2 of 2021)

Details

Maturity
Discontinued
Promoter
House of Representatives (Libya)
Period
2021
Keywords
elections, political representation, legislation, quota reform

Context

In the run-up to Libya's planned December 2021 elections, the House of Representatives adopted Law No. 2 of 2021 (5 October 2021) governing the 200-seat chamber; earlier post-revolution frameworks and the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement had targeted a 30% quota for women in parliament.

Objectives

Earlier frameworks aimed to secure a 30% quota for women candidates in the House of Representatives; Law No. 2 of 2021 instead reserved only 32 of 200 seats (16%) for women, roughly halving that target.

Activities

Passage of Law No. 2 of 2021 by the House of Representatives, reserving 32 of 200 seats (16%) for women candidates; parallel UN Women-backed advocacy secured a separate 30% quota commitment for the Government of National Unity's own appointments, resulting in the appointment of five women ministers including Libya's first woman foreign minister, Najla el-Mangoush.

Results

Women held just 14% of parliamentary seats in 2021 (per Wikipedia country statistics) — below even the reduced 16% quota. The planned December 2021 elections governed by this law were postponed indefinitely, so the lower quota was never tested at the ballot box. Libyan women's organisations and activists (e.g. Kheiria Ferej El-Fergiani, Salwa Saleh) publicly criticised the reduction as discriminatory.

Conclusions

The episode illustrates that quota levels set by ordinary legislation, without constitutional entrenchment, can be rolled back; it stands as a cautionary case rather than a success, even as parallel appointive-track gains (30% GNU quota, five women ministers) show progress remained possible outside the elected chamber.

Implementation

Indicative cost
Low (< €50k) — No cost or resource-allocation data is associated with this legislative change; it is a regulatory/legal act rather than a funded programme.
Time to results
Short (< 1 year) — Enacted as a single legislative act (Law No. 2 of 2021, adopted 5 October 2021) ahead of December 2021 elections that were then postponed indefinitely, leaving the quota's real-world effect untested.
Staffing & skills
Libyan House of Representatives (legislature that drafted and passed the law), UN Women Libya/Arab States office (advocacy and technical support for the appointive quota), Libyan women's rights advocates and civil-society organisations (public monitoring and criticism)

Conditions for success

  • Constitutional (rather than ordinary-statute) entrenchment of quota levels to prevent reversal
  • Sustained civil-society and international monitoring of electoral-law drafting
  • Alignment between elected-chamber and appointive-track quota commitments

Common failure modes

  • Quota set by ordinary legislation rather than constitutional provision, leaving it vulnerable to reduction
  • Indefinite postponement of elections meant the reduced quota was never actually implemented or tested
  • Political fragmentation and lack of consensus around the electoral framework

Where it fits

Governance type
transitional/post-conflict parliamentary system
Scale
national
Income level
upper-middle income (oil-based economy)

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