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Good practice Imported

South Korea's Urban Regeneration New Deal — Neighbourhood-Scale Renewal Since 2017

South Korea · Busan · See the South Korea profile · See the Busan profile

Evidence: Observational / pre–post Top 63% 62/100 · Ask Evidence Copilot about this practice

Since 2017, South Korea's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport has funded small-scale neighbourhood renewal at hundreds of sites as an alternative to bulldoze-and-rebuild redevelopment; peer-reviewed evidence shows population decline continued at most studied sites.

-8.8 %
Average population change after project completion (Busan sites) (post-completion, studied through 2023)
-38.2 %
Population decline at worst-performing site (post-completion)
+37.6 %
Average local business count change (Busan sites) (post-completion)
19 %
Completed projects rated 'excellent' by evaluators (of 116 completed projects)
300 to 1.1 million visitors/year
Visitor numbers, Daegu Jung-gu flagship project (2008–2015)

Details

Maturity
Established
Promoter
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT)
Period
2017–present
Keywords
urban regeneration, housing, local economic development

Context

Launched by South Korea's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT) in December 2017, the Urban Regeneration New Deal funds neighbourhood-scale renewal — from small residential 'Our Neighbourhood Restoration' schemes to larger industrial/port 'Economic-Base Type' projects — selected annually across five categories, as an alternative to demolition-and-rebuild redevelopment. Mandatory local Urban Regeneration Support Centers institutionalise resident participation.

Activities

MOLIT selected 68 sites in December 2017, 99 in 2018 and 116 in 2019 (283 cumulative through 2019), backed by a five-year (2018–2022) national funding target of roughly KRW 50 trillion (about US$44 billion) combining state finance, the Housing and Urban Fund and public-enterprise investment.

Results

A 2023 peer-reviewed Heliyon study of Busan sites found average population continued falling by 8.8% after project completion (one site down 38.2%), even as local business counts rose 37.6% on average — only one studied site gained population. An independent review of MOLIT's own project database, reported by Seoul Economic Daily in 2026, found only 19% of 116 completed projects rated 'excellent', 63% 'average' and 19% 'unsatisfactory', attributed mainly to lost maintenance funding and staff once state support ended. A KRIHS case study of the flagship Daegu Jung-gu project found visitor numbers rising from about 300 (2008) to 1.1 million (2015), but grocery stores falling from 25 to 10 and clothing stores from 5 to 3 as cafés grew from zero to seven — a documented gentrification effect alongside commercial revival.

Conclusions

The programme shows real institutional scale and continuity, but its own evaluation evidence points to persistent population decline at most studied sites and uneven post-completion outcomes once state funding ends.

Implementation

Indicative cost
Very high (> €5M) — National five-year (2018–2022) funding target of roughly KRW 50 trillion (~US$44 billion), combining state finance, the Housing and Urban Fund and public-enterprise investment across hundreds of sites.
Time to results
Long (> 3 years) — Annual site-selection rounds since December 2017 (68 sites in 2017, 99 in 2018, 116 in 2019); five-year national funding window 2018–2022; individual projects run multiple years to completion with evaluation afterward.
Staffing & skills
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT), Mandatory local Urban Regeneration Support Centers, Local governments and public enterprises, Housing and Urban Fund

Conditions for success

  • Institutionalised resident participation via mandatory local support centres
  • Combination of state finance, Housing and Urban Fund and public-enterprise investment
  • Annual multi-category site selection (five project categories) allowing tailored small-scale interventions

Common failure modes

  • Lack of maintenance funding and staff once state support ends (KRIHS review)
  • Population decline continuing at most studied sites despite investment
  • Displacement of everyday retail (groceries, clothing) by cafés — a gentrification effect at the flagship Daegu site

Commonly funded by

ERDF — European Regional Development Fund National / regional programmes

Indicative funding routes for practices of this type — always check each programme's current calls and eligibility rules.

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Data sources

Where this practice's information was retrieved from, and when.

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