Moldova's presidential STRATCOM centre monitors coordinated inauthentic online activity, exposing a 129-site, 50-language pro-Kremlin network reaching roughly 500,000 daily impressions via AI-generated content and deepfakes around the 2024–2025 elections.
Languages used by disinformation network (May–September 2025)
~500,000 impressions/day
Daily impressions generated by network (May–September 2025)
29 staff
Staff cap (2025)
Details
Maturity
Established
Promoter
STRATCOM — Centrul pentru Comunicare Strategică și Combatere a Dezinformării
Period
2023–present
Keywords
public sector, national security, strategic communication, election integrity
Context
The Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation (STRATCOM) was created by a law passed by Moldova's Parliament in July 2023 at President Maia Sandu's initiative. Oversight moved from Parliament to the Presidency in August 2025, and a presidential decree of 16 September 2025 fixed its structure at up to 29 staff, organised around a Situational Awareness and Forecasting Directorate and a Resilience Building directorate.
Activities
STRATCOM monitors inauthentic online behaviour and works alongside EU-backed monitoring (a joint 'stress test' of digital hybrid-threat scenarios run with the European Commission) and NGO-run AI monitoring such as International Media Support's LetsData algorithm.
Results
Its report covering May–September 2025 documented the 'Pravda Network': at least 129 websites publishing in more than 50 languages and generating roughly 500,000 impressions a day, using AI-generated articles, deepfakes and inauthentic social accounts to undermine trust in Moldovan institutions around the October 2024 presidential election/EU-accession referendum and the 2025 parliamentary election.
Conclusions
STRATCOM's own detection methodology is not fully public, and its move between parliamentary and presidential oversight within two years signals an institution still settling its governance model.
Implementation
Indicative cost
Medium (€50k–€500k) — Not disclosed in available sources beyond staffing cap.
Time to results
Medium (1–3 years) — Created by law in July 2023; oversight and structure fixed by presidential decree in August–September 2025; ongoing operations through at least 2025 elections.
Staffing & skills
Up to 29 staff, Situational Awareness and Forecasting Directorate, Resilience Building Directorate, Oversight moved from Parliament to the Presidency (August 2025)
Conditions for success
Clear statutory basis (2023 law) and a presidential decree fixing structure and staffing
Coordination with EU-backed 'stress test' exercises and NGO monitoring (LetsData)
Regular public reporting naming networks and tactics
Common failure modes
Analytical/AI detection methodology is not fully disclosed publicly, limiting independent verification of accuracy
Governance model has shifted between parliamentary and presidential oversight twice within two years, suggesting institutional instability
Where it fits
Governance type
national government / presidential oversight
Scale
national
Income level
lower-middle-income
Commonly funded by
National / regional programmes
Indicative funding routes for practices of this type — always check each programme's current calls and eligibility rules.
Do you run this practice?
Claim it —
verified implementers get a public contact pathway and can propose corrections.
Data sources
Where this practice's information was retrieved from, and when.
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