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Good practice

VIGINUM's D3lta — France's Open-Source AI Tool for Detecting Coordinated Disinformation

France · Paris · See the France profile

Since 2021 France's VIGINUM service has tracked foreign disinformation networks with AI tools; in 2025 it open-sourced D3lta, an LLM-based detector for coordinated inauthentic content, after exposing 1,000+ bot accounts and 43 operations around the Paris Olympics.

1,000+
Bot accounts identified in RRN network (2023-11)
43
Information-manipulation operations detected during Paris Olympics (2024)
5
Inauthentic French-language outlets exposed
~200
Pre-positioned websites in Portal Kombat network (2024-02)

Details

Maturity
Established
Promoter
VIGINUM (Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale)
Period
2021–2025
Keywords
national security, information integrity, digital government, open-source AI

Context

VIGINUM was created in July 2021 under France's Secretariat general de la defense et de la securite nationale (SGDSN), reporting to the Prime Minister, with a mandate to detect and characterise foreign digital interference targeting French public debate.

Activities

Built D3lta, an LLM-based tool that detects coordinated duplication of text at scale across copypasta, reworded and translated content, plus a meta-detector running ten synthetic-content detectors at once; open-sourced D3lta on GitHub in December 2024 and presented it at the Paris AI Action Summit in February 2025 so other governments, journalists and researchers could reuse and improve the method.

Results

Attributed the 'Doppelganger'/RRN influence network to the Social Design Agency and Struktura (June 2023); identified a network of over 1,000 bot accounts on X tied to RRN (November 2023); exposed five inauthentic French-language outlets; detected 43 separate information-manipulation operations during the 2024 Paris Olympics; jointly disclosed the 'Portal Kombat' network of roughly 200 pre-positioned websites with counterparts in Poland and Germany (February 2024).

Conclusions

These are published detection counts, not an independently measured reduction in citizens' exposure to disinformation; VIGINUM itself frames its tools as decision support for analysts, not automated takedown or censorship systems.

Implementation

Indicative cost
High (€500k–€5M)
Time to results
Long (> 3 years)
Staffing & skills
VIGINUM analysts (statutory government service under SGDSN/Prime Minister's office)

Conditions for success

  • Open-sourcing the detection tool (GitHub, December 2024) so other governments, journalists and researchers can reuse and improve the method
  • Statutory mandate and direct reporting line to the Prime Minister's office providing institutional backing
  • Combining an LLM-based coordinated-duplication detector with a meta-detector running multiple synthetic-content detectors simultaneously

Data sources

Where this practice's information was retrieved from, and when.

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