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Good practice Imported

Villes Sans Bidonvilles — Morocco's National Slum-Elimination Programme

Morocco · Casablanca · See the Morocco profile · See the Casablanca profile

Evidence: Observational / pre–post Top 83% 57/100 · Ask Evidence Copilot about this practice

Morocco's national in-situ upgrading, rehousing and resettlement programme cut the share of urban households living in slums from 8.2% to 4.5% between 2004 and 2014; by 2018 the government had declared 58 of 85 targeted cities officially slum-free.

8.2% percent
Urban households living in slums, 2004 (2004)
4.5% percent
Urban households living in slums, 2014 (2014)
58 of 85 targeted cities
Cities declared officially slum-free (by June 2018)
~1.5 million residents
Residents targeted (2004–2018)
Villes Sans Bidonvilles — Morocco's National Slum-Elimination Programme

Details

Maturity
Discontinued
Promoter
Ministère de l'Habitat et de la Politique de la Ville / Al Omrane Group, Kingdom of Morocco
Period
2004–2018
Keywords
housing, urban upgrading, informal settlements, public housing policy

Context

Launched in 2004 by the Kingdom of Morocco's Ministry of Housing and Urban Policy through the Al Omrane Group, Villes Sans Bidonvilles ('Cities Without Slums') targeted roughly 1.5 million residents of about 1,000 informal settlements across 85 cities, combining three strategies: in-situ upgrading, rehousing, and resettlement to new peripheral plots.

Activities

The programme combined in-situ upgrading, rehousing, and resettlement to new peripheral plots across 85 targeted cities, delivered by Al Omrane with World Bank co-financing and analysis.

Results

National slum prevalence fell from 8.2% of urban households in 2004 to 4.5% in 2014, and by June 2018 the government declared 58 of the 85 targeted cities officially 'slum-free,' figures cited by both the Kingdom of Morocco and the World Bank, which co-produced a poverty and social impact analysis of the programme; UN-Habitat and the World Bank subsequently held it up as a replicable model for other governments.

Conclusions

Independent peer-reviewed reviews found a more mixed picture in later phases: resettlement became increasingly costly for beneficiaries, formalisation disrupted the informal livelihoods and social networks built around the original settlements, and some low-income households could not afford to build on their allocated resettlement plots — a caution that results were not uniform across phases or cities.

Implementation
Indicative cost
Very high (> €5M)
Time to results
Long (> 3 years)
Staffing & skills
Ministère de l'Habitat et de la Politique de la Ville, Kingdom of Morocco, Al Omrane Group, World Bank

Conditions for success

  • Three complementary strategies (in-situ upgrading, rehousing, resettlement) matched to different settlement conditions
  • Joint government/World Bank monitoring and impact analysis providing external validation
  • International endorsement (UN-Habitat, World Bank) as a replicable reference model

Common failure modes

  • Resettlement became increasingly costly for beneficiaries in later phases
  • Formalisation disrupted informal livelihoods and social networks built around original settlements
  • Some low-income households could not afford to build on their allocated resettlement plots

Where it fits

Governance type
national ministry with World Bank co-financing
Scale
national (85 cities)
Income level
lower-middle-income

Commonly funded by

National / regional programmes

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Data sources

Where this practice's information was retrieved from, and when.

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