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Good practice Imported

Colombo Urban Regeneration Project — Sri Lanka's Contested High-Rise Resettlement Programme

Sri Lanka · Colombo · See the Sri Lanka profile · See the Colombo profile

Evidence: Descriptive / self-reported Top 95% 43/100 · Ask Evidence Copilot about this practice

Since 2010, Sri Lanka's UDA has relocated tens of thousands of families from Colombo's shanty settlements into high-rise housing; a $200M AIIB loan (2019-2027) continues it, but watchdogs document coercive evictions and undersized replacement units.

200 million USD
AIIB loan (2019, current phase) (2019–2027)
5,500 households
Households targeted in current AIIB-financed phase (2019–2027)
23,000 people
People targeted in current AIIB-financed phase (2019–2027)
50,000 families
UDA original relocation goal (since 2010)
70,000–135,000 families
Families targeted across programme phases (CPA estimate range) (as of 2014)
400–550 square feet
Replacement unit size (since 2010)
5 billion Sri Lankan rupees (~$38 million)
Value of shanty site leased to private developer (n/a)
Colombo Urban Regeneration Project — Sri Lanka's Contested High-Rise Resettlement Programme

Details

Maturity
Scaling
Promoter
Urban Development Authority (UDA), Sri Lanka
Period
2010-2027 (ongoing, AIIB-financed phase closing 2027)
Keywords
urban resettlement, public housing, informal settlements, land redevelopment

Context

Since 2010, Sri Lanka's Urban Development Authority (UDA) — placed under the Ministry of Defence and Urban Development between 2010 and 2015 — has pursued a 'slum-free Colombo' agenda, relocating families from inner-city shanty and underserved settlements into government-built multi-storey apartment blocks, typically 400–550 square feet in size. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank approved a $200 million loan in April 2019 to continue the programme as the 'Support to Colombo Urban Regeneration Project,' financing relocation for roughly 5,500 additional households (about 23,000 people) in its current phase, with the loan closing scheduled for December 2027.

Results

Reported targets and figures vary significantly by source and year — the UDA's original stated goal was to relocate 50,000 families, while Sri Lanka's Centre for Policy Alternatives documented figures ranging from 70,000 to 135,000 families targeted across programme phases as of 2014. AIIB itself classifies the project's resettlement component as Category A, its highest environmental and social risk rating, 'due to the scale and complexity of the involuntary resettlement involved.'

Conclusions

Independent documentation from the Centre for Policy Alternatives, the Bank Information Center and Sri Lankan and international press describes evictions carried out with military involvement, short or no notice, and in many cases no compensation; replacement units too small for the large extended families that occupied them, producing what researchers describe as 'vertical slums'; and separation of previously adjacent households. Critics point to cases such as a Colombo shanty site leased to a private developer for 5 billion rupees (about $38 million) over 99 years as evidence that freeing high-value land for commercial redevelopment, not resident welfare, has driven parts of the programme. AIIB has publicly committed to reforms — including proximity-based relocation and stronger post-resettlement support — in response to these documented shortcomings. This practice is included as an honest, evidence-based cautionary case: it demonstrates real delivery of housing stock and urban redevelopment at scale, alongside serious, independently documented harms to the communities it displaced.

Implementation

Indicative cost
High (€500k–€5M) — Current AIIB-financed phase: $200 million loan (approved April 2019, closing December 2027) for roughly 5,500 households. Earlier phases' financing is not detailed in the sources reviewed.
Time to results
Long (> 3 years) — Ongoing since 2010; current AIIB-financed phase runs through loan closing in December 2027.
Staffing & skills
Urban Development Authority (UDA), Sri Lanka — implementing agency (under the Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, 2010–2015), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) — financing, current phase

Conditions for success

  • AIIB has publicly committed to post-2019 reforms, including proximity-based relocation and stronger post-resettlement support, in response to documented shortcomings

Common failure modes

  • Independent documentation (Centre for Policy Alternatives, Bank Information Center, press) describes evictions carried out with military involvement, short or no notice, and in many cases no compensation
  • Replacement units (400–550 sq ft) are documented as too small for the large extended families that occupied them, producing what researchers describe as 'vertical slums'
  • Previously adjacent households were separated during relocation
  • A shanty site was leased to a private developer for 5 billion rupees (~$38M) over 99 years, cited by critics as evidence that freeing high-value land for commercial redevelopment, not resident welfare, drove parts of the programme
  • AIIB classifies the resettlement component as Category A, its highest environmental and social risk rating, due to the scale and complexity of involuntary resettlement

Commonly funded by

National / regional programmes ERDF — European Regional Development Fund

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Data sources

Where this practice's information was retrieved from, and when.

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