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Good practice

Costa Rica's Gender Parity Electoral Code — 49% Women in Legislature (2009–2026)

Costa Rica · San José · See the Costa Rica profile

Costa Rica's 2009 Electoral Code mandates 50% women on all candidate lists with strict vertical and horizontal alternation and electoral sanctions; women held 49.1% of Assembly seats in 2022–2026 and won a historic majority in February 2026, making Costa Rica a globally cited ben

38.6 %
Women's share of Legislative Assembly seats (2014–2018)
45.6% (26 women)
Women's share of Legislative Assembly seats (2018–2022)
49.1% (28 women)
Women's share of Legislative Assembly seats (2022–2026)
First-ever female majority in Costa Rica's history
Legislative Assembly result (February 2026)
Costa Rica's Gender Parity Electoral Code — 49% Women in Legislature (2009–2026)

Details

Maturity
Established
Promoter
Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (TSE) de Costa Rica
Period
2009-present
Keywords
government, electoral law, political participation, Latin America

Context

Costa Rica's 2009 Electoral Code (Código Electoral) mandates that 50% of candidacies be women, with alternating male-female placement enforced both vertically (within each district list) and horizontally (across all districts). The Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (TSE) rejects any non-compliant candidate list before it reaches the ballot.

Objectives

To close the design gap seen in earlier regional quota systems, where parties placed women too low on lists to be elected, and to achieve genuine gender parity in the Legislative Assembly.

Activities

TSE reviews and rejects non-compliant party lists ahead of each election, enforcing the dual-axis (vertical and horizontal) alternation rule across all parties and districts.

Results

Women's share of the 57-seat Legislative Assembly rose in a near-linear progression: 38.6% (2014–2018), 45.6%/26 seats (2018–2022), and 49.1%/28 seats (2022–2026), culminating in a historic female majority after the February 2026 elections.

Conclusions

Academic assessments (Americas Quarterly 2023) attribute the results to the dual-axis alternation mechanism rather than a simple percentage target, and cite Costa Rica alongside Bolivia and Mexico as a model of strong quota enforcement; a remaining gap persists in single-member executive races (presidency, vice-presidency, mayors) where list-alternation rules do not apply.

Implementation

Implementation detail (cost, timeline, staffing, conditions for success) is not yet available for this practice.

Data sources

Where this practice's information was retrieved from, and when.

Attachments

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