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Evidence: Observational / pre–post Top 14% 80/100 · Ask Evidence Copilot about this practice
NASK's Disinformation Analysis Centre ran 'Parasol Wyborczy' during Poland's 2025 presidential election, blocking 96% of accounts impersonating candidates, reporting over 16,000 inauthentic accounts to platforms, and processing about 27,500 disinformation alerts.
Ahead of Poland's 2025 presidential election, the Ministry of Digital Affairs and NASK-PIB (National Research Institute) ran 'Parasol Wyborczy' ('Electoral Umbrella'), a coordinated monitoring and rapid-response programme covering the official campaign period (1 February-1 June 2025), amid warnings of Russia-linked influence operations.
NASK's Disinformation Analysis Centre (Ośrodek Analizy Dezinformacji, OAD) combined continuous 7-day monitoring cycles with algorithmic detection of coordinated inauthentic networks - including clusters of accounts using AI-generated visuals to amplify pro-Russian narratives on X - alongside citizen and institutional reporting channels. A parallel ARAKIS-GOV system logged cybersecurity threat alerts during the same period.
OAD identified 176 incidents of accounts impersonating presidential candidates and had 169 (96%) blocked. Over 16,000 inauthentic accounts tied to influence operations were reported to Facebook, X and TikTok, including 3,836 substantive reports covering false content, impersonation, AI-generated material and election-silence violations. A Rapid Response Team processed roughly 27,500 potential disinformation reports, of which about 23,700 were confirmed valid and forwarded for action. Independent reporting by Cyberdefence24 corroborated the scale of the problem: between 1 February and 17 March 2025 it counted hundreds of impersonating profiles per candidate (872 on X and 297 on Facebook for two leading candidates), and found that about 17% of all presidential-election conversation on Facebook and X between 28 December 2024 and 28 January 2025 came from inauthentic profiles. ARAKIS-GOV logged over 2.2 million cybersecurity threat alerts and 1,544 confirmed incidents during the period, of which 27 targeted election-related entities.
NASK's own report candidly notes that automated detection struggles with context, irony and sarcasm, and that platforms fully removed only about 12% of the 46,511 disinformation items NASK flagged over the full year, moderating 68% and leaving roughly 20% unaddressed - underscoring that detection scale has outpaced platform enforcement.
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