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Good practice Imported

Spain Criminalizes AI-Generated Deepfake Nudes of Minors — the Legislative Response to the Almendralejo Schoolgirl Scandal

Spain · Madrid · See the Spain profile · See the Madrid profile

Evidence: Descriptive / self-reported Top 56% 47/100 · Ask Evidence Copilot about this practice

After AI 'nudification' apps were used to create sexual images of 20 schoolgirls aged 11-14 in Almendralejo, Spain's government criminalized non-consensual AI-generated intimate imagery nationwide, adding Article 173 bis to the Penal Code.

20 schoolgirls aged 11-14
Victims in the Almendralejo case
15
Minors sentenced (June 2024)
1 year
Probation sentence length
16 years
New minimum age of consent for own-image use
1-2 years
Prison penalty range under new Article 173 bis
Spain Criminalizes AI-Generated Deepfake Nudes of Minors — the Legislative Response to the Almendralejo Schoolgirl Scandal

Details

Maturity
Established
Promoter
Government of Spain — Council of Ministers / Ministry of Equality
Period
2023-2025
Keywords
government, digital child protection, legislation, education policy

Context

In September 2023, fifteen minors in Almendralejo, Spain, used the AI app 'Clothoff', accessed via Telegram, to generate sexually explicit images of twenty female classmates aged 11 to 14, based on clothed social-media photos; the images circulated across at least four of the town's five middle schools.

Objectives

Close the legal gap exposed by the case by criminalising non-consensual AI-generated intimate imagery of minors nationwide and setting a clear minimum age of consent for use of one's own image.

Activities

In June 2024, the fifteen minors were sentenced to one year of probation with mandatory educational rehabilitation, on twenty counts each of child sexual abuse material offences and offences against moral integrity. On 25 March 2025, Spain's Council of Ministers approved a draft Organic Law on the Protection of Minors in Digital Environments, adding Article 173 bis to the Penal Code: it criminalises dissemination of non-consensual AI-generated pornographic content (one to two years' imprisonment) and sets a minimum age of 16 for a person to consent to use of their own image. The reform also requires device manufacturers to include effective parental-control systems and promotes complementary digital-skills and addiction-prevention education.

Results

The juvenile sentencing (probation only) was described by critics as lenient relative to the scale of harm (20 victims). Corporate-responsibility analysts noted that existing EU regulatory instruments, including the AI Act, had imposed no adequate preventive obligations on AI nudification apps prior to the Almendralejo case.

Conclusions

The reform closes a regulatory gap analysts flagged in existing EU-level instruments, but its real-world enforcement and deterrent effect has not yet been evaluated.

Implementation

Indicative cost
Low (< €50k) — A legislative/criminal-law reform (Organic Law amendment) rather than a funded programme; costs are primarily judicial and enforcement capacity, not a discrete budget line.
Time to results
Medium (1–3 years) — From the September 2023 Almendralejo case to the March 2025 Council of Ministers approval of the draft Organic Law was about 18 months; juvenile sentencing concluded in June 2024.
Staffing & skills
Council of Ministers / Ministry of Equality (legislative drafting), Judicial system (juvenile courts) applying sentencing

Conditions for success

  • Device manufacturers required to include effective parental-control systems
  • Complementary digital-skills and addiction-prevention education promoted alongside the criminal-law change
  • Codifying a clear minimum age of consent (16) for use of one's own image to close prior legal ambiguity

Common failure modes

  • Critics judged the initial juvenile sentencing (probation only) lenient relative to the scale of harm
  • Existing EU-level instruments (the AI Act) had imposed no preventive obligation on nudification apps prior to the case, showing the reform closed the gap only after harm occurred

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