evidoria

← Back to browse

Good practice Imported

Sweden's Psychological Defence Agency — A National Institution to Counter Foreign Disinformation

Sweden · Karlstad · See the Sweden profile

Evidence: Descriptive / self-reported Top 50% 60/100 · Ask Evidence Copilot about this practice

Established January 2022 under Sweden's Ministry of Defence, the Psychological Defence Agency (MPF) tracks foreign influence operations and builds citizen resilience — from exposing a false child-services narrative to Nordic media-literacy campaigns.

60 people (approx.)
MPF staff headcount (2022-ongoing)
26 countries (plus Ukraine)
Countries participating in Ctrl+Alt+Disinfo game jam
Sweden's Psychological Defence Agency — A National Institution to Counter Foreign Disinformation

Details

Maturity
Established
Promoter
Swedish Psychological Defence Agency (Myndigheten för psykologiskt försvar, MPF)
Period
2022–ongoing
Region (NUTS)
SE311
Keywords
public administration, defence, disinformation, media literacy

Context

Established on 1 January 2022 under Sweden's Ministry of Defence, the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency (Myndigheten för psykologiskt försvar, MPF) is a dedicated national institution tasked with identifying, analysing and countering foreign information influence activities directed at Sweden, building on tracking of Russian influence infrastructure since 2014.

Objectives

MPF's mission is to coordinate and strengthen Swedish psychological defence across agencies, municipalities, regions, companies and organisations, and to build the resilience of the Swedish population against foreign disinformation.

Activities

The agency employs roughly 60 staff across three departments - administrative, capability-building and operational. In its most detailed documented case, it identified an Arabic-language disinformation outlet spreading false claims that Swedish child-protection services (LVU) were abducting Muslim children, partnered with Swedish public broadcasters to expose the campaign's extremist origins, and briefed the Prime Minister, who held a press conference addressing it directly. The agency has since expanded into public education, publishing handbooks for journalists (with the Fojo media institute) and citizens, and supporting the international 'Ctrl+Alt+Disinfo' game jam on media literacy with participants from Ukraine and 26 other countries.

Results

The disinformation outlet case is described by the agency itself as 'a small platform with very few people' that nonetheless proved highly effective at generating conflict and hatred in Arabic-speaking communities - illustrating both the risk MPF was built to address and the scale at which a single case can escalate.

Conclusions

Independent analysis (New Eastern Europe, 2024) notes the agency has published no quantified effectiveness metrics - its own account of impact rests on this single detailed case study and unspecified vulnerability-monitoring work, making its resilience-building approach easier to document than to measure.

Implementation

Indicative cost
Medium (€50k–€500k) — Ministry of Defence-funded national agency of roughly 60 staff; specific budget not disclosed in sources.
Time to results
Long (> 3 years) — Established 1 January 2022, ongoing as a permanent national institution.
Staffing & skills
~60 staff across administrative, capability-building and operational departments

Conditions for success

  • Formal Ministry of Defence mandate and statutory mission
  • Partnerships with public broadcasters and the Fojo media institute for public communication
  • International collaboration (26-country 'Ctrl+Alt+Disinfo' game jam) to extend media-literacy reach

Common failure modes

  • No quantified effectiveness metrics published; public account of impact rests on a single detailed case study

Where it fits

Governance type
national government agency
Scale
national, standing institution
Income level
high income

Commonly funded by

National / regional programmes

Indicative funding routes for practices of this type — always check each programme's current calls and eligibility rules.

Do you run this practice? Claim it — verified implementers get a public contact pathway and can propose corrections.

Data sources

Where this practice's information was retrieved from, and when.

Attachments

Similar practices you may find useful