CSSPS — Ghana's National Computerised School Selection and Placement System
Ghana
Ghana's CSSPS algorithm placed 483,800 of 590,309 qualifying 2025 BECE candidates (82%) into secondary schools nationwide, but a release-day portal …
Chile · Santiago · See the Chile profile · See the Santiago profile
Evidence: Observational / pre–post Top 43% 53/100 · Ask Evidence Copilot about this practice
Chile's SAE, built with Universidad de Chile researchers using a Nobel Prize-winning Deferred Acceptance algorithm, matched 274,000+ pre-K–12 students to 6,400+ schools nationwide and raised joint sibling placement by 13 points, per a peer-reviewed Operations Research study.
Chile's 2015 School Inclusion Law banned publicly subsidised schools from selecting students by social, religious, economic or academic criteria and eliminated co-payments, forcing a redesign of how students are matched to schools nationwide. Chile's Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) partnered with a team of Universidad de Chile researchers to design and implement the Sistema de Admisión Escolar (SAE).
SAE adapts the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (the Gale–Shapley mechanism, for which Lloyd Shapley and Alvin Roth shared the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences) to a simultaneous, nationwide, all-grade matching problem spanning pre-K to 12th grade, piloted from 2016 in the Magallanes region before national rollout. Because the new law removed walk-zone priority and there is no guaranteed public school transport, MINEDUC asked the research team to also help keep siblings together, though this is not a legal requirement; the researchers designed a two-lottery, family-level tie-breaking mechanism for this purpose.
A peer-reviewed paper in Operations Research reports that, in the studied application cycle, over 274,000 students applied to more than 6,400 schools simultaneously. The researchers' own simulations, run on real family preference data, show the two-lottery mechanism raises the share of siblings placed in the same school by 13 percentage points compared with standard student-level tie-breaking. Simulated outcomes under different socio-economic quota orderings show 51–68% of students receiving their first-preference school, with 5.6–14.6% left unassigned in the main round depending on quota design and disadvantaged status; unassigned students are covered through a complementary round and ultimately guaranteed a no-co-payment seat at the closest school with space.
Chile's Ministry of Education publicly praised the algorithm's transparency and strategy-proofness in 2022, though this is a ministry statement rather than an independent audit, and the cited outcome figures come from the system's own designers rather than a third-party evaluator.
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Ghana
Ghana's CSSPS algorithm placed 483,800 of 590,309 qualifying 2025 BECE candidates (82%) into secondary schools nationwide, but a release-day portal …
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone's Teaching Service Commission, with EdTech Hub and Fab Inc., built a Nobel-inspired matching algorithm pairing teachers' preferences with …
United States of America
NYC's DOE uses a Gale-Shapley matching algorithm to place ~75,000 eighth-graders a year across 1,600+ schools; 92% got a top-five …
United States of America
MIT Operations Research Center PhD students won Boston Public Schools' 2016 routing challenge; their algorithm cut 50 buses (about 8% …
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