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Good practice Imported

Yozma Program — Israel's Government-Seeded Venture Capital Catalyst

Israel · Jerusalem · See the Israel profile · See the Jerusalem profile

Evidence: Observational / pre–post Top 19% 81/100 · Ask Evidence Copilot about this practice

In 1993 Israel's government committed $100M to co-invest in ten hybrid public-private VC funds, each pairing a new Israeli manager with a foreign VC firm. The funds were privatized by 1998; Israel's VC industry grew from ~$30M (1992) to ~$10B under management (2001).

100 USD million
Government initial commitment (1993)
200 USD million
Assets under management in Yozma-seeded funds (1993) (1993)
2,000 USD million
Assets under management in Yozma-seeded funds (2001) (2001)
30 USD million
Israeli VC/private-equity industry AUM (1992) (1992)
10,000 USD million
Israeli VC/private-equity industry AUM (2001) (2001)
130
Number of VC funds active (2001) (2001)
Yozma Program — Israel's Government-Seeded Venture Capital Catalyst

Details

Maturity
Discontinued
Promoter
Israel Innovation Authority (formerly Office of the Chief Scientist, Ministry of Industry and Trade)
Period
1993-1998
Keywords
venture capital, technology policy, economic development, startups

Context

The Yozma Program was launched in 1993 by Israel's Office of the Chief Scientist (today the Israel Innovation Authority) to build a professional venture-capital industry that barely existed in the country at the time. The government committed USD 100 million, of which about USD 20 million capitalised the Yozma Fund itself and USD 80 million co-invested — at up to 40% of committed capital — alongside private partners in ten newly formed hybrid VC funds of roughly USD 20 million each.

Activities

Each fund was required to pair a nascent Israeli VC management team with an established foreign venture firm and an Israeli financial institution, deliberately importing international know-how and deal-sourcing networks. Private partners held an option to buy out the government's stake after several years at cost plus interest, and by 1997–1998 the government had sold its interests in most of the ten funds and exited the program.

Results

Capital under management in the original Yozma-seeded funds grew from USD 200 million in 1993 to roughly USD 2 billion by 2001, while Israel's broader VC/private-equity industry grew from about USD 30 million in 1992 to roughly USD 10 billion by 2001, spread across some 130 funds. Government-linked funds fell from about half of Israeli VC investment in the early 1990s to almost none by 2000, and by 1998–2001 Israel had the highest venture-capital investment as a share of GDP of any OECD country.

Conclusions

Economists caution against attributing the boom to Yozma alone: Israel's high-tech base already existed before 1993, built on decades of defense R&D spending, and the program coincided with the mass immigration of roughly 750,000 highly educated Jews from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. A deliberate attempt to replicate the model, New Zealand's Venture Investment Fund, has been markedly less successful, suggesting Yozma's specific outcome depended on pre-existing conditions as much as the mechanism itself.

Implementation

Indicative cost
Medium (€50k–€500k) — USD 100 million total government commitment: ~USD 20 million capitalised the Yozma Fund directly, USD 80 million co-invested (up to 40% of committed capital) across ten ~USD 20 million hybrid funds.
Time to results
Medium (1–3 years) — Active government-funded phase 1993–1998; government fully exited via fund privatizations/buy-outs by 1997–1998.
Staffing & skills
Israel Office of the Chief Scientist / Ministry of Industry and Trade (now Israel Innovation Authority), Ten newly formed hybrid VC fund management teams, Foreign venture capital firms and Israeli financial institutions as fund co-investors

Conditions for success

  • Mandatory pairing of a new Israeli VC manager with an established foreign VC firm and a local financial institution
  • Private buy-out option incentivizing privatization and removal of ongoing government involvement
  • Pre-existing high-tech base from decades of defense R&D and an inflow of ~750,000 highly educated immigrants in the 1990s

Common failure modes

  • New Zealand's deliberate replication (Venture Investment Fund) was markedly less successful, suggesting outcomes depended on pre-existing conditions as much as the funding mechanism
  • Sources disagree on secondary implementation details (number of funds exited, length of buy-out window)

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